Writ Petitions Against NCLT Orders and the Limitation Trap
A litigant aggrieved by an NCLT order has one road: an appeal to the NCLAT within the time fixed by Section 421(3) of the Companies Act, 2013. A detour through the writ court does not stop the clock. That is the central lesson of a recent judgment of the NCLAT Chennai Bench in Rajeev Vidhyadharan @ Rajeev Anchal & Anr. v. P.J. Mathews & Ors. (Company Appeal (AT)(CH) No. 162 of 2025). The Bench of Justice Sharad Kumar Sharma (Judicial Member) and Jatindranath Swain (Technical Member) went further. It held that a High Court which finds a writ petition not maintainable cannot then condone delay on the NCLAT’s behalf. It also held that time spent pursuing a writ appeal and a review, after being told of the statutory remedy, earns no exclusion under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Writ petitions against interlocutory NCLT orders remain a common tactic, and this judgment sharply raises its cost. This article explains the statutory framework, the Tribunal’s reasoning, the points open to debate, and the practical lessons for litigants and counsel.
The facts in brief
The appeal arose from a company petition before NCLT Kochi concerning Jatayupara Tourism (P) Ltd., the company behind the Jatayu Earth’s Center in Kollam. An Administrator appointed by the NCLT was managing the project while the petition was pending. The appellants were a promoter and his company; the contesting respondents were largely investors acting through a common Power of Attorney holder. The NCLT directed that a civil contractor’s outstanding dues be settled within a short deadline, with an independent chartered accountant to verify the payment. That direction was the order under appeal.
Instead of appealing, the appellants took a long route through the High Court:
A writ petition against earlier interim orders of the NCLT, itself filed beyond the Section 421(3) outer limit, later amended to challenge the order under appeal.
Dismissal by the Single Judge, who held that Section 421 provided an appellate remedy and found no breach of natural justice. A related contempt case had also been dismissed with a similar observation.
A writ appeal, dismissed by the Division Bench with liberty to approach the NCLAT within 15 days and a direction that the appeal not be dismissed on the ground of delay.
A review petition against the Division Bench judgment, which only deleted an adverse observation about suppression of facts.
Finally, the company appeal before the NCLAT.
The NCLAT Registry reported a substantial delay in filing, and a further delay in refiling after defects were not cured.
The issues framed
The Tribunal candidly noted an “awkward situation” it often faces: High Courts, while dealing with limitation, effectively decide part of the appeal and direct the NCLAT to hear it on merits. It framed three questions:
How far can a High Court, under Articles 226 and 227, regulate NCLAT proceedings in a way that touches the merits of an appeal?
When can a litigant who first went to the writ court claim exclusion of time under Section 14 of the Limitation Act?
What is the legislative intent on limitation for appeals before the NCLAT?
Holding 1: NCLT orders and the writ jurisdiction
The Tribunal held that writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is, in effect, displaced for NCLT orders unless there is an apparent breach of a fundamental right under Part III. Its reasoning ran on four lines.
Adjudication is not a Part III violation. When the NCLT decides a dispute on merits, no fundamental right is ordinarily engaged. Even a complaint of breach of natural justice, or of the NCLT’s procedural rules, can be fully examined by the NCLAT in appeal.
Certiorari is the only relevant writ. A challenge to an NCLT order can only be in the nature of certiorari. That writ presupposes a supervisory relationship which, the Bench held, the statute does not create.
Territory. The Chennai Bench hears appeals from NCLTs across five States. The Bench reasoned that it would be untenable for each of those High Courts to issue directions to a Tribunal seated outside its territory. Article 227(1) supervision is confined to courts and tribunals within a High Court’s territory.
The statutory scheme. NCLAT judgments go directly to the Supreme Court under Section 423 of the Companies Act and Section 62 of the IBC. The statute does not route them through any High Court. The Bench relied on Embassy Property Developments v. State of Karnataka (2020) 13 SCC 308 and its own earlier ruling in Johnson Lifts v. Tracks & Towers Infratech, 2024 SCC OnLine NCLAT 2424.
The Bench described Article 226 as an extraordinary remedy meant for situations where the law provides no other forum. Using it to sidestep the forum under Section 421, or Section 61 of the IBC, was termed an abuse.
Holding 2: A court without jurisdiction cannot condone delay
The appellants’ main plank was the Division Bench’s direction that the NCLAT should not dismiss the appeal on the ground of delay. The NCLAT declined to treat that direction as binding on it.
The reasoning is simple. Once the High Court held the writ proceedings not maintainable, it was functus officio on the merits. Condonation of delay is part of the merits of the appeal, because it decides whether the appeal is maintainable at all. That question lies exclusively with the appellate forum constituted under the Companies Act.
The Bench drew on a consistent line of authority.
Asma Lateef v. Shabbir Ahmad [2024] 1 SCR 517 — a court must be at least prima facie satisfied of maintainability before granting any relief.
Nivruti G. Ahire v. State Bank of Maharashtra (Bombay HC) — delay cannot be condoned where the main proceeding is not maintainable.
Pridhvi Asset Reconstruction v. Naihaa Retail (Madras HC, OSA 257/2016) — Section 14 relief can be granted only by the forum before which the proceeding is presented.
Raj Ranjeet Singh v. Bind Bahadur Singh, AIR 1973 All 547 — a court returning a plaint does not decide Section 14 for the court that will receive it.
This holding was decisive. The appeal was in fact filed within the 15-day window the Division Bench had allowed. Had the direction bound the NCLAT, the delay could not have been held against the appellants. The case therefore squarely tests the limits of such directions, and the NCLAT answered that a High Court cannot regulate its adjudicatory function in this way.
Holding 3: Section 14 needs bona fides, due diligence and good faith
The appellants argued, in the alternative, that the time spent in the High Court should be excluded under Section 14. The Tribunal rejected this, finding none of the provision’s conditions satisfied.
It identified the Single Judge’s dismissal of the writ petition as the turning point. At that stage the appellants were told, in terms, that their remedy lay under Section 421. From then on, every further step in the High Court was a deliberate choice, not a bona fide mistake of forum.
Bona fides. Filing a writ appeal against a judgment that merely relegated the party to the statutory remedy, and then a review, showed the appellants were not acting honestly. The Bench drew on Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta (1999) 6 SCC 222 and Raghunath G. Panhale v. Chaganlal Sundarji AIR 1999 SC 3864 for the meaning of the term.
Good faith. Section 2(h) of the Limitation Act requires due care and attention. Relying on Deena v. Bharat Singh(2002) 6 SCC 336, Ghasi Ram v. Chait Ram Saini (1998) 6 SCC 200 and Firm of Sivdutt Rai Gulab Rai v. Union of India AIR 1960 AP 406, the Bench held that a party who continues a proceeding after it is held not maintainable does not act in good faith.
Due diligence. Applying Chander Kanta Bansal v. Rajinder Singh Anand (2008) 5 SCC 117 and Consolidated Engineering Enterprises v. Irrigation Department (2008) 7 SCC 169, it held that a prudent litigant, once informed of the remedy, would have gone straight to the NCLAT.
Review is not a continuation. Time spent on a review does not count for Section 14. Limitation runs from the principal decision, whether of the Single Judge or the Division Bench.
The Bench drew a sharp line between an alternative remedy and a statutory remedy. An alternative remedy offers a choice of forum. A statutory appeal under Section 421 does not; the parallel writ route is simply unavailable.
Kalpraj Dharamshi v. Kotak Investment Advisors (2021) 10 SCC 401 was distinguished. There, the writ petitioner had raised a genuine natural justice grievance and the High Court had heard it fully, so its pursuit of the writ was bona fide. Here, the High Court had expressly found no breach of natural justice.
Holding 4: Section 421(3) is a self-contained code; appeal dismissed
The Tribunal treated the Companies Act as a special law with its own inbuilt limitation. Section 421(3) allows 45 days to appeal, extendable by a further 45 days on sufficient cause. General principles of the Limitation Act yield to that scheme, applying Gujarat State Civil Supplies Corporation v. Mahakali Foods (2022) and Kaushalya Rani v. Gopal Singh AIR 1964 SC 260.
On the computation, the appeal failed on any view. Counted from the NCLT order, even the extended 90-day period had long expired. Counted most generously from the Single Judge’s dismissal of the writ petition, the 90-day outer limit had still lapsed, if only narrowly, before the appeal was filed.
The point is significant: the NCLAT has no power to condone delay beyond the outer limit in Section 421(3), so a lost window cannot be recovered.
The NCLAT therefore declined to condone the delay and dismissed the company appeal as barred by limitation.
Analysis
The outcome is sound, and the Section 14 analysis is the strongest part of the judgment. Section 14 protects a litigant who chose the wrong forum in good faith. It was never meant to reward one who was told the right forum and kept knocking on the wrong door. Treating the Single Judge’s dismissal as the moment of knowledge gives a clear, workable test.
The functus officio reasoning is also persuasive. A court that holds it has no jurisdiction over a dispute cannot logically decide a question, such as condonation, that forms part of that dispute. It sits well with the Supreme Court’s emphasis in Embassy Property on keeping IBC and Companies Act disputes within the statutory hierarchy.
Some of the broader observations, however, may invite scrutiny.
“Ousted” goes further than the Supreme Court has gone. L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997) 3 SCC 261 treats judicial review under Articles 226 and 227 as part of the basic structure. Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks (1998) 8 SCC 1 and later cases treat an alternative remedy as a rule of self-restraint, not a bar. Writs remain available where a tribunal acts wholly without jurisdiction, breaches natural justice, or a statute’s vires is challenged. Embassy Property and Kalpraj Dharamshi themselves recognise such windows.
The territorial point fits NCLAT better than NCLT. NCLT Kochi sits within Kerala, and the order under challenge was the NCLT’s. The multi-State argument explains why a High Court should not direct the NCLAT. It is less compelling as a reason to exclude Article 227 over an NCLT Bench located within that High Court’s territory.
Comity between forums. The NCLAT declined to follow a Division Bench direction made in a judgment that had attained finality between the parties. The judgment explains why the direction was beyond jurisdiction, but the tension is real. The appropriate forum to resolve it, if pursued, is the Supreme Court under Section 423.
IBC language in a Companies Act appeal. The judgment speaks of time being of the essence under the IBC, although the appeal arose from a Companies Act petition. Nothing turns on this, since the decision rests independently on Section 421(3).
None of these points disturbs the result. On the facts, the appellants were outside time even on the most generous computation, and their conduct could not meet Section 14.
Lessons for practitioners
Appeal first, always. Against any NCLT order, file under Section 421 of the Companies Act or Section 61 of the IBC within time. A writ petition does not suspend limitation.
Know the outer limit. Section 421(3) gives 45 days plus a further 45 on sufficient cause. Beyond 90 days, the NCLAT cannot condone delay.
Reserve writs for true exceptions. Use Article 226 only where the NCLT acts wholly without jurisdiction or a statutory provision is challenged. Even then, consider a protective appeal in parallel.
Stop when the court points the way. Once a court holds that the statutory appeal is the remedy, go to the NCLAT at once. A writ appeal or review after that point will not earn Section 14 exclusion.
Do not rely on a High Court’s condonation. A direction from a court that has declined jurisdiction may not bind the NCLAT. Plead and prove sufficient cause before the NCLAT itself.
Cure defects promptly. Refiling delay is counted separately and adds to the case against condonation.
For respondents, track the timeline. Where an appellant has detoured through the writ court, a limitation objection framed around the date of judicial notice of the remedy can be decisive.
Case details
Case: Rajeev Vidhyadharan @ Rajeev Anchal & Anr. v. P.J. Mathews & Ors.
Number: IA No. 1812 of 2025 in Company Appeal (AT)(CH) No. 162 of 2025
Forum: National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, Chennai Bench
Coram: Justice Sharad Kumar Sharma (Judicial Member) and Jatindranath Swain (Technical Member)
Reported: 2026 LLBiz NCLAT 195
Provisions: Section 421, Companies Act, 2013; Sections 2(h) and 14, Limitation Act, 1963; Articles 226 and 227, Constitution of India
The author appeared for Respondents 2 to 8 in this matter. The views expressed are personal and are offered for educational purposes; they are not legal advice.
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